Maradona is proving again and again that he does nt know how to select a good team..No Zanetti, Cambiasso, Lucho....
Athletico lifts the Europa league.....
Forlan was just too good..Aguerro shows some falshes of brilliance...good for Argentina..
Maradona is proving again and again that he does nt know how to select a good team..No Zanetti, Cambiasso, Lucho....
To be fair, Cambiasso has not performed for Argentina for a pretty long time. He has been good for Inter, but it is not a guarantee that same form is going to be translated for the natinal team. The main problem is Zanetti and Milito.
And it is not as if the team that Maradona took over were performing miracles on the field. Actually they were in shambles and had only one win in 7 matches in their qualifing rounds before he took over.. Maradona may not have done anything great so far, but he has not done worse neither..
Manchester United’s failings down to a lack of attacking variation
May 11, 2010
It depends how you want to interpret the number ‘1′. There is no shame in losing a league title by a single point, but the flip side is that when you’re a club as used to success as Manchester United, a mere one season without silverware is considered a failure.
The statistics about goals easily sum up United’s problems. They had the best defensive record, despite the fact that first-choice central defensive partnership Rio Ferdinand and Nemanja Vidic started just nine of the 38 games together.
Where they trailed Chelsea, however, was in front of goal. The raw ‘goals scored’ statistic demonstrates how far they were behind Chelsea in this respect, but perhaps becomes slightly irrelevant in terms of the league title when Chelsea were winning games 7-0 and 8-0.
United actually scored more goals this season than in their title-winning display last term, but the problem was the distribution of goals. Last season, United were the master of the 1-0 win – they won ten matches by that scoreline. This season, there were just four 1-0s. Their goal tally was inflated this season because they thrashed teams more often – four 4-0s, and three 5-0s.
The more salient statistic is that on six occasions United didn’t find the net, a fact that seems more alarming when compared to Chelsea’s record of scoring in 37 of 38 games (Birmingham were the only side to keep them out) or last year’s record, when it was three times (one of them after United had clinched the title).
This turned out to be crucial – a single goal in the scoreless game against Blackburn would have won them the title. And six shut-outs is all the more surprising when you consider that United had more than 50% of possession in every game all season with the exception of one (away at Arsenal, when they convincingly won by playing on the counter-attack anyway). They had the ball, so why couldn’t they find the net?
Losing two top-class players in Cristiano Ronaldo and Carlos Tevez last summer was clearly always going to be difficult to recover from, whilst Dimitar Berbatov’s lack of form, Michael Owen’s injury problems and Wayne Rooney’s own fitness worries played a part – had Rooney played against Blackburn, things could have been different.
But there is an argument that, in terms of quality, United were not that much weaker than last season. Rooney’s transformation into a world-class central striker, Antonio Valencia’s instant impact on the right wing and Nani’s vast improvement partially made up for the loss of Ronaldo, whilst Michael Owen scored only two fewer goals this season than Tevez did last season, despite being injured for the final three months.
United’s problem this season was not a lack of quality, but a lack of variation in attack. Ronaldo and Tevez were so useful for United in recent years not merely because of their ability, but because of their versatility. Both players could play on the left, on the right, as a central striker or just off the front. Given Rooney’s similar nature, and Nani and Park’s ability to play on either flank comfortably, United were so difficult to face, because the opposing manager was never sure quite what he would be facing – even when he became aware of United’s starting XI.
Owen and Valencia, however, are both limited to one position. Owen is a forward, plain and simple (although he has developed his game into a more all-round player in recent years) whilst Ferguson has acknowledged that Valencia is only comfortable on the right-hand side – before the match away in Bayern, he admitted dropping Valencia in favour of Park and Nani on the wings, because those two had the ability to switch midway through the game if necessary. If it was a factor in Munich, it’s fair to say that it will have been a factor at other points in the season, and handicapped Ferguson’s ability to tactically outwit opposing managers.
And of course, the lack of versatility of Valencia and Owen has a knock-on effect on other players in the side. Nani’s ability to play on either flank is of little use if Valencia’s right-sidedness dictates he must play on the left (Nani admits he prefers the right).
United’s lack of striking options when Rooney was injured late in the season suddenly became very apparent, especially with Berbatov’s lack of confidence. In that crucial game at Blackburn, the Bulgarian played alongside Federico Macheda (making his first start of the season) as United failed to score. United seemed rigid and inflexible. Last season, with Rooney, Tevez and Ronaldo able to interchange, the Blackburn defence would have been left guessing until the final minute. This season, United were simply too predictable when it came to breaking down the opposition on six occasions, and ultimately it cost them the title.
Ferguson’s shopping list this summer will surely feature an attacking player, but versatility might be as important as raw quality. Ferguson has become a fine tactician in recent years, and he needs the right tools to work with – this season he was constrained by too many players being one-dimensional.
THANKS , NICE ONE.
If there was an Van Nistelrooy/Andy Cole/Dwight Yorke type quality Strikers instead of Berbatov , United might have won the title by a good margin. I HAVE TO SAY THEY HAVE DONE A DECENT JOB TO FINISH JUST ONE POINT BEHIND CHELSEA , CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT TWO OF THEIR TALISMAN's LEFT THE CLUB.THEY HAVE COPED WELL TO AN EXTEND.UNLUCKY AGAINST BAYERN IN THE CL , OTHERWISE IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A INTER v MAN UTD FINAL.
Chelsea’s Premiership win: a lesson in bringing the best out of star players
Chelsea – Premiership champions 2009/10. A great side? Probably not, but it’s hard to argue that, over the course of the season, they do not deserve to lift the trophy.
In terms of the players who have started the greatest number of matches, Chelsea’s XI this season reads: Petr Cech (34); Branislav Ivanovic (21), John Terry (37), Ricardo Carvalho (22), Ashley Cole (25); Jon Obi Mikel (21), Michael Ballack (26), Frank Lampard (36), Florent Malouda (25), Nicolas Anelka (31) and Didier Drogba (31).
And yet, on only one one occasion this season has that XI actually started a match together, in the 2-0 home victory over Arsenal in February, when Ancelotti fielded a Christmas Tree formation with Anelka and Malouda playing Didier Drogba.
That system has not been the regular system for Chelsea throughout the season, however. Indeed, Chelsea have won the league despite it being difficult to identify Carlo Ancelotti’s first-choice XI, or even his first-choice formation.
He began the season with a diamond midfield – something rarely seen throughout Premiership history – as Chelsea threatened to run away with the title. They won twelve of their first fourteen games with a cumulative score of 37-8.
Chelsea diamond v Manchester United, November
The main problem with the diamond shape though, as always, was its lack of width. Neither Anelka or Drogba is particularly comfortable drifting wide, whilst Florent Malouda playing ‘from in to out’ doesn’t have the effect fielding a natural winger does.
The natural solution, therefore, was for the full-backs to get forward to provide width, and Ashley Cole and Jose Bosingwa’s pace and energy meant Chelsea could afford to play a narrow midfield. Boswingwa’s season-ending injury in mid-October was a big blow to the diamond, however (until then he had started every game) as Ancelotti was forced to turn to Branislav Ivanovic at right-back.
Ivanovic is an excellent defender and has had a very good season, but doesn’t offer the attacking threat of Bosingwa. Having spent much of the season at right-back, he has improved on the ball, but initially he didn’t work with the diamond. This weakness in Chelsea’s system was exposed when Manchester United visited Stamford Bridge, as Sir Alex Ferguson deployed Antonio Valencia high up the pitch to nullify Ashley Cole, with Ryan Giggs tucked in on the other side. This meant that United could match Chelsea’s diamond AND prevent the threat from left-back with a right-winger, leaving one striker up the pitch. Ivanovic was free and had time to advance, but he was not as much of an attacking threat as Bosingwa would have been, and Ferguson was happy for him to have the ball. United dominated the game, and were unfortunate to lose.
ZM said at the time that Chelsea won that match despite – rather than because of - the diamond, and that Ferguson had effectively found it out. Soon after, Chelsea hit problems – a draw at home to Everton, a loss at Manchester City, a draw away at West Ham, a draw at Birmingham – and late 2-1 wins over Fulham and Portsmouth. Jack Collison and Shaun Wright-Phillips played Valencia-esque roles against Ashley Cole, and Chelsea continued to struggle for width. Two narrow wins from six games was not title-winning form, even if they still started the new decade on top of the league.
Chelsea 4-3-3 v Manchester United, March 2010
The Africa Cup of Nations was held up as something that might derail Chelsea’s season, but it turned out to be crucial in keeping them on top. The absence of Drogba (and Saloman Kalou) meant Chelsea didn’t have the resources to continue with a two-striker system, and so Ancelotti reverted to a ‘christmas tree’ shape, with Joe Cole and Florent Malouda floating behind Nicolas Anelka. They barely missed Drogba in wins over Sunderland, Birmingham and Burnley, and the Cole-Malouda-Anelka trident would later guide Chelsea to important wins, including the ultimately crucial 1-2 victory at Old Trafford, and the crushing 7-1 win over Aston Villa.
The final third of the season saw Ancelotti playing various shapes – the diamond, the christmas tree, and a 4-3-3 / 4-2-3-1 – and it often appeared he wasn’t quite sure of his best system. This was a problem against a well-drilled, efficient Inter side, and Chelsea were deservedly beaten home and away.
In the Premiership, however, Ancelotti could get away with the constant switches because the defensive base of the side remained the same. It always featured a back four, and always featured (at least) three midfielders who started from the centre of the pitch. Whether the three forwards were arranged in a wide system or in a more narrow setting didn’t make too much difference to how Chelsea’s defence operated. We never saw a three-man defence, or a traditional four-man midfield, and Ancelotti was rigid in the fact he always played a back four supplemented with three central midfielders – in this sense similar to how Mourinho’s Chelsea operated.
Further forward, Ancelotti was able to adapt the shape to suit the game – and suit his on-form players. Malouda, Drogba and Lampard all peaked at different points in the season, and all preferred slightly different formations. Whichever system Chelsea played, it always brought the absolute best out of one of those three – Malouda and Drogba played their best football in a Chelsea shirt, whilst Frank Lampard ended the season with 14 goals in 11 games.
Chelsea 4-2-3-1 v Liverpool, May
Admittedly, the flipside of this was that Chelsea didn’t really find a system that completely suited their two creative players (Lampard and Malouda) as well as their two strikers (Drogba and Anelka) at the same time. In the diamond, Lampard’s midfield runs were restricted and Malouda was playing too centrally, but Drogba and Anelka were on fire. In the 4-3-2-1, Anelka struggled behind the frontman and Drogba’s link play wasn’t great, but Lampard and Malouda were in their element. The system worked better with Anelka upfront, and Drogba benched, as against Manchester United.
Ancelotti never found a system that suited all four, so Chelsea relied on individual brilliance in the final third rather than a genuinely cohesive shape. Often this worked brilliantly – recording 7-2, 7-1, 7-0 and 8-0 victories in the final four months of the season. When one player didn’t provide inspiration, however, they suddenly looked completely out of ideas, as the two defeats to Inter, the 2-4 loss against Manchester City and the limp 2-1 defeats away to Everton and away to Tottenham showed. But maybe, when your two strikers are Anelka and Drogba – hardly the definition of ‘team players’ – you have to bring the best out of the individuals rather than worry too much about the combination play.
They ended the system with something more like a 4-2-3-1 (as against Liverpool) which was ruthless and looked unstoppable, but this wouldn’t have been an option throughout the season – a central midfield partnership of Lampard and Ballack would surely have struggled against the genuinely top sides in the Premiership and Champions League.
In all, Chelsea deserve the title, even if crucial, incorrect refereeing decisions in both victories over Manchester United can be pinpointed as fortunate moments. Ancelotti becomes just the fifth manager in Premiership history to win the title, and records only the second league victory of his career.
A common criticism of struggling managers is that they ‘don’t know their best eleven’, but with this victory, Ancelotti has proven that you don’t always need to.